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1. Introduction: Background and Central 
Research Question
The key issue is that we now know reasonably 
well what kind of actions can increase the 
chances of success and what kind of actions will 
diminish the chances of success. The problem is 
that we always seem to choose the latter rather 
than the former.
 
   Lord Paddy Ashdown (5 July 2006),
International High Representative and EU Special Representative 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2002 – January 2006
In the post-Cold War era, the world was faced with 
a political environment that significantly differed 
from the one before. Civil wars became a familiar 
characteristic of this new environment.1 This change 
also influenced the manner in which the international 
community responded. Namely, with civil wars 
becoming a lasting problem of global politics, peace 
operations have become an area in which a lot of 
human and financial resources have been invested. 
Even though the United Nations (UN) has been the 
primary actor involved in peace support operations, 
several other governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations have been very proactive as well. 
Among the plethora of international organizations and 
individual countries taking part in such processes, 
the European Union (EU) has also stepped in. As 
Howorth (2001) concludes:
“[t]he presence around the EU’s periphery 
of an ‘arc of crisis’, running from the Baltic 
through the indefinable border between east 
and west, and down to the Balkan, the eastern 
Mediterranean and along the north African 
shoreline to Mauritania (in other words 
along the entirety of the EU’s ‘near-abroad’), 
offers multiple potential scenarios for crisis 
management” (Howorth 2001: 768). 
The EU has not only been acting as a conflict 
manager and peacebuilder in its neighbourhood, 
but also at a broader, global level. The primary 
mechanism for this has been the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP).2
1  This is not to be confused with the existing 
influential conventional wisdom that it was the change in the 
international system that sparked the outbreak of numerous 
civil wars. For more on this discussion and a counterclaim, see 
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin 2003.
2  With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the 
European Security and Defence Policy was renamed to 
 Ever since its launch in 1999, the ESDP has 
been developing very rapidly. At the same time, the 
ESDP has probably been the most integral part of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Consequently, military and civilian missions, which 
are the main instruments of the ESDP, have become 
an essential characteristic of the EU’s foreign policy. 
In this respect, the military missions can be seen as 
short-term and the civilian missions as medium-term 
and long-term crisis management instruments. Until 
November 2010, as many as 24 operations within the 
ESDP framework were deployed to various conflict 
areas in the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, 
Middle East, Asia, and Africa. A significant proportion 
of them, as many as 13, is constituted by civilian 
missions. This, together with the three combined 
civilian-military missions and the significant attention 
of the EU devoted to developing its civilian crisis 
management aspect (Nowak 2005: 15), makes the 
civilian component somewhat a trademark of the 
ESDP. 
 At its Feira meeting in June 2000, the 
European Council identified four priority areas 
for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management (CCM): 
police, rule of law, Civilian Administration, and Civil 
Protection (Council of the European Union 2000). 
Consequently, police and rule of law seem to have 
become the two areas developing the fastest of the 
European CCM (Nowak 2005). However, with the 
rule of law requiring a domination of the security 
space first, the police missions have been vital 
in establishing secure post-conflict settings, and 
enabling longer-term reforms to take place.
 More than ten years after the launch of 
ESDP in 1999, and seven years after the launch 
of its first mission, the European Police Mission to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) in 2003, it is of 
great importance to be able to assess the impact 
that the police missions have had on the situation 
of the host countries’ police sectors. So far, mission 
assessments have been conducted internally, by 
standards of the implementing actor, after concluding 
the mandate. However, there seems to be consensus 
among both academics and practitioners that it is 
problematic for the implementing actor to be the 
only evaluator of the mission outcomes (Baldwin 
2000; Pushkina 2006). Relying solely on this kind 
of assessment is problematic for several reasons. 
Namely, setting one’s own benchmarks can be 
troublesome as it allows for setting the ‘bar’ too low in 
order to avoid failures. Furthermore, such reflection 
leaves no possibility for assessing the policy 
Common Security and Defence Policy. However, ensuring 
consistency throughout this paper, the former name will be 
used.
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options and the eventual policy choice. As a result, 
these internal assessments often do not coincide 
with the general public and even the academic 
assessment. Yet, “[t]he need to assess their impact 
is paramount, given that intervening often means 
becoming part of the local predicament” (Schwarz 
2005: 431). More importantly, there is no consensus 
on what constitutes success in peace operations. 
Many evaluation criteria have been put forward. 
Oldrich Bures (2007: 414-415) has grouped the 
various criteria under four headings. One suggested 
criterion, for instance, is whether the purpose of the 
mission, as stated in the mandate, has been fulfilled 
(Brown 1993; Durch 1995; Ratner 1995; Bratt 1996). 
Furthermore, there are scholars who are in favour 
of including the impact on the local population in 
the criteria for evaluating peace operations (Durch 
1995; Ratner 1995). A third proposed evaluation 
criterion is the way in which the mission outcomes 
have been reached, i.e. whether there were any 
casualties, how efficient the mission was, etc. The 
fourth proposed criterion is the contribution of the 
mission to broader values instead of self-serving 
gains (Pushkina 2006). These criteria, however, 
do not provide a generalizable standard that would 
allow for a systematic evaluation across missions, 
regardless of the location of their deployment and/or 
the implementing actor. 
 The situation is even more difficult when 
it comes to evaluating civilian missions, including 
ESDP police missions. First, most of the civilian 
missions focus on achieving goals that are difficult 
to quantify. Second, in instances when a particular 
actor is engaged in a ‘crowded’ field, as it is the 
case with many civilian missions, it is difficult to 
distinguish the results achieved by the mission from 
the influence of other international organizations’ 
forces deployed there. Third, it often happens that 
one actor acts through several different mechanisms, 
which also contributes to the difficulty in singling out 
the role the mission itself has played. To that end, 
in addition to assessing the situation at the moment 
of the mandate’s conclusion, it is equally crucial to 
assess the durability and sustainability of the reforms 
introduced and/or supported by the ESDP police 
missions after the completion of the mandate. In that 
sense, the involvement of the locals in the reforms 
and local ownership of the reform process also play 
a role. Therefore, the central research question of 
this paper is how local ownership influences the 
differences in sustainability of police reforms after 
the completion of the ESDP mandate.
 Given that the programmes of an ESDP 
police mission directly relate to specific reforms in 
the police sector of the host country, ‘sustainability 
of reforms’ can be considered the same as (and 
hereafter used interchangeably with) ‘sustainability 
of programme outcomes’. In the context of this 
paper, ‘sustainability of reforms’ is understood as 
the reform remaining in place after the mandate has 
been completed.
 By analyzing two missions that have taken 
place in the same time period (2003-2005), the 
institutional learning within the EU is assumed to be at 
the same level. Additionally, the implementing actor 
(EU) is also the same in both missions. Therefore, 
the answer is to be looked for directly on the ground. 
Rather than looking at the implementation of policy 
reforms only, this analysis focuses on the reform 
process from as early as the planning phase of the 
reforms and the missions. The paper argues that the 
better locals are involved in shaping reforms, i.e. the 
earlier they are involved in the reform process, the 
more sustainable the reforms. More concretely, a 
stronger involvement in the decision-making process 
is not only conducive to an early detection of the 
areas that need to be addressed, but also ensures 
a sense of local ownership of, and thus identification 
with the reform process and the reform outcomes. 
 Looking at the completed ESDP police 
mandates in the Balkans, as a place where EU 
conditionality is also at play (e.g. by using the 
signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) and/or granting a candidate-country status), 
which increases the leverage for successful reform 
implementation, the paper focuses on the EUPM 
I in Bosnia and EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia. 
Analyzing these two cases, this paper seeks to 
explain the differences in sustainability of mission 
and programme outcomes, shedding light on the 
role of local ownership.3
3  The paper is largely based on confidential interviews 
conducted by the author in Berlin, Brussels, Sarajevo and 
Skopje with Bosnian, Macedonian, EUPM, and former 
Proxima officials, officials from the European Commission 
and the Council Secretariat, and various experts in the field in 
2009 and 2010. The author is truly grateful for the cooperation 
and assistance provided by the interviewees. While all of the 
interviewees have given consent to be quoted, for reasons of 
confidentiality their names and positions are not mentioned 
here.
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2. Case Selection: Why ESDP Police Missions 
in the Balkans?
Ever since the launch of the CFSP on the eve of the 
breakout of the Yugoslav war(s), which was the first 
serious institutionalized attempt of the EU member 
states to coordinate their foreign policies, South 
East Europe (SEE) has been closely connected to 
the development of this policy. Even more so, this 
has been the case with the ESDP. As a response to 
Europe’s inability to deal with violence in Bosnia on 
its own, and the EU’s limited say in NATO’s war in 
Kosovo, this region was to become the ‘birthplace’ 
of the ESDP. Furthermore, “[the] EU had its first 
military mission in the Balkans (Operation Concordia 
in Macedonia); developed integrated civil-military 
peace-building approaches (both in Macedonia and 
in BiH); and launched the biggest military mission 
to date (EUFOR-ALTHEA) and [the] biggest ever 
civilian mission (in Kosovo)” (Montanaro-Jankovski 
2007: 141). That being said, the Western Balkans 
can easily be labeled as a ‘testing ground’ for ESDP. 
In addition to that, the role the EU has acquired 
through its missions in the region can be seen as 
the genesis of what is already perceived as a more 
influential role of the Union at the global level. 
 More importantly, the European Council in 
Thessaloniki in 2003 has clearly identified the SEE as 
the region to be integrated into the EU next (Council 
of the European Union 2003a) which gave strong 
impetus to the political elites of all SEE countries to 
have EU accession as their goal. At the same time, 
even though the relations of the EU with each of the 
so-called transition countries are at different stages, 
there is the paradox of 'postmodern ambiguity' — 
'Europeanization' being discursively constructed 
(Busch and Krzyzanowski 2007). In essence, this 
implies that the meaning of being ‘European’ (e.g. 
action/behaviour) is derived from a certain discourse 
and is displayed by a certain kind of rhetoric. This 
certainly allows the EU, through an inter-institutional 
cooperation between the mission on the ground 
and the European Commission, to fit the missions' 
objectives into the construction of 'Europeanization'.4 
In other words, without having a clear definition of 
what ‘Europeanization’ means, the term in these 
countries has been discursively constructed to the 
level of being synonymous to ‘good’ and as symbolic 
of breaking off from the past. Therefore, the reform 
process is seen as a process of Europeanization, 
and opponents to certain reforms are labeled as 
anti-European.
Contextualizing the link between the EU and 
4  For a study on this phenomenon in Bosnia, see 
Majstorovic (2007).
the Western Balkans historically, Chandler argues 
that after the Yugoslav wars
“[t]he international institutions, involved 
in stabilizing and integrating the SEE 
states within European structures, viewed 
the question of governance as one of the 
three central issues (along with security 
and economic reform) which needed to be 
addressed for a successful statebuilding 
outcome. Within the sphere of SEE state 
governance, it was the key issues of 
institution building and of civil society 
development, which attracted the focus 
of international regulatory bodies. Both 
institution building and civil society 
development were fairly new areas for 
international policy initiatives at the time 
and both reflected the existing power that the 
European Union had over the region which 
enabled external institutions to take an active 
interest in questions which were previously 
seen to be ones of domestic political 
responsibility” (Chandler 2007: 596). 
Precisely this deep involvement and the 
power the EU has over the region, which creates 
solid grounds for successful reforms, make the 
ESDP civilian missions being deployed in the SEE 
countries interesting to be observed in terms of 
outcomes. With such a high leverage for successful 
reforms, the region provides empirical data for a 
potential ‘reverse Sinatra test’, i.e. ‘if it can’t make it 
there, it won’t make it anywhere’.5 So far, the EU has 
had four civilian missions in the Balkans — EUPOL 
Proxima to Macedonia, and the follow-up police 
advisory team EUPAT, EUPM to Bosnia, and EULEX 
to Kosovo. Given that EULEX is an ongoing rule of 
law mission, and taking the small size of EUPAT 
in consideration, this paper focuses on EUPOL 
Proxima in Macedonia, and the first mandate of 
EUPM in Bosnia (2003-2005).
5  The ‘Sinatra test’ in social science methodology is 
used in reference to the least likely case for a theory to hold, 
i.e. a strong indication for the validity of the theory. The phrase 
refers to the famous line of Frank Sinatra’s song “New York, 
New York” — “if I can make it there, I can make it anywhere.”
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3. Case Studies: Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia
3.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
3.1.1 Overview of the EU Involvement in BiH
The long and devastating war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was finally settled with the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace, commonly referred 
to as the Dayton Agreement, initialed at the Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on 21 
November 1995, and signed in Paris on 14 December 
1995. According to Annex IV of the Agreement, i.e. 
the Constitution of BiH, the country is composed 
of two entities — the Bosniak-Croat Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republika 
Srpska — and Brcko District, which has a special 
status. Furthermore, the Federation has ten cantons 
with separate political and administrative institutions. 
According to the Constitution, all aspects of policing 
were left to the responsibility of the two entities (in 
the Federation further sub-divided into ten cantonal 
police forces, in Republika Srpska sub-divided into 
five public security centers) and Brcko District, 
which all together led to the country being left with 
a “multiplicity of overstaffed policing forces without 
provisions for structures co-operation, operation 
liaison or intelligence exchange” (EUPM 2006: 10).
In the newly created state structures in BiH, 
as laid down in Annex X of the Dayton Agreement, 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was 
to act as the Agreement’s guarantor and the one 
to facilitate the signatories’ efforts to implement the 
peace agreement. The High Representative (HR) 
was to be appointed by the international community, 
i.e. the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), and 
was meant to be a senior foreign diplomat able to 
settle disputes. As stipulated in Article II.9 of Annex X 
of the Agreement, the HR had no authority over any 
military or police forces. However, with the situation 
remaining unstable and calls for violence being 
broadcasted on public media, the PIC authorized 
the HR in May 1997 to stop these incitations — 
a decision that led to a surprisingly successful 
handling of the Republika Srpska public television 
broadcast (Knaus and Martin 2003: 64). Moreover, 
this success led to the PIC handing “new powers [to 
the HR] in the crucial areas of institutional reform, 
substantial legislation, and the personnel of public 
office — all for the sake of implementing the peace 
agreement — [without] substantive or procedural 
checks on the use of the new powers” (Knaus and 
Martin 2003: 64). These new powers came to be 
known as ‘Bonn powers’.6 
In grasping the overall EU presence in the 
country, it is important to note that since 2002 the HR 
is double-hatted as the EU Special Representative. 
In addition, the EU deployed its first mission to BiH 
in 2003, with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) taking 
over from the UN’s International Police Task Force 
(IPTF). The initial mandate of the mission was three 
years, between 2003 and 2005, which is the case 
this research will focus on. Since then, however, 
the mandate of EUPM has been prolonged and 
amended several times.7
Parallel to EUPM, the EU also deployed 
a military mission to Bosnia - EUFOR Althea. In 
November 2004 the European Council decided to 
launch Operation Althea (Council of the European 
Union 2004), which marked the transition from the 
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to the EU 
Force (EUFOR). With the immediate goal being a 
smooth hand-over period between the two forces, 
Althea has two further objectives: to support BiH’s 
progress towards EU integration, simultaneously 
aiming at concluding the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, and in the long run, to contribute to the 
goal of peace and stability in the country and its 
eventual accession to the EU. Having both Althea 
and EUPM on the ground at the same time has also 
required their close co-ordination, since both of them 
are meant to contribute to the full implementation 
of the Dayton Agreement, albeit one (EUPM) has 
a non-executive mandate and has to contribute to 
the long-term capacity building of the police forces, 
while the other (EUFOR) has an executive mandate 
in providing a safe and secure environment. This 
approach, however, has not always gone as smooth 
as envisioned by ‘Brussels’. Namely, with many 
‘grey areas’ between the two mandates, especially 
in regard to the fight against organized crime, the 
coordination between EUPM and EUFOR was a 
very “distressing exercise” (Juncos 2007: 58). This 
lasted until the end of 2005 when general guidelines 
for coordination between EUPM, EUFOR and HR/
EUSR were agreed.8 
 
6  For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and 
the scope of the Bonn Powers, see European Stability Initiative, 
“Bosnian Power Structures Part 2.”
7  For the legal basis of the mandates and their 
changes, see Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, Council 
Joint Action 2003/141/CFSP, Council Joint Action 2003/188/
CFSP, Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP, Council Joint 
Action 2007/749/CFSP, Council Decision 2009/906/CFSP. 
8  For details on the agreement, see EU Police Mission 
(EUPM), EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(EUFOR) and EU Special Representative (EUSR) (2005).
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3.1.2 EUPM I
As noted above, the police reform in BiH began under 
the auspices of the UN’s IPTF and then continued 
with the support of the EUPM. When discussing 
police reforms in post-war Bosnia one ought to keep 
three critical issues in mind. First, “security sector 
[including police] and rule of law reforms were not 
clearly articulated objectives among policy makers 
at Dayton, nor during the immediate post-war period” 
(Penksa 2008: 28). Second, in the case of BiH one 
needs to distinguish between police reform and 
restructuring. While implementing police reforms 
within the old structures at moments looked like a 
Sisyphean task10, neither IPTF nor EUPM were 
mandated to initiate a political discussion about police 
restructuring. Over time, however, on the initiative 
of the OHR and in particular HR Lord Ashdown, 
the police reform agenda evolved to one focusing 
on police restructuring after all (Penksa 2008: 29). 
Third and closely related, the overall police reform 
began without a broader political agreement or a 
complete legal reform, which additionally impeded 
the activities in the police sector. 
The planning of the EUPM was based on the 
reports of three fact-finding missions to Sarajevo in 
the pre-planning phase (December 2001 – January 
2002) and on the information received from IPTF 
(EUPM 2006: 14). EUPM I took over from IPTF in 
January 2003. A clear distinction between IPTF and 
EUPM should be made in regard to their mandates 
and especially the fact that while the EUPM has 
been non-executive, the IPTF had a wide range of 
executive powers in regard to decertifying police 
officers and initiating investigations in certain 
circumstances. Despite this distinction, it took a 
considerable amount of time for the EUPM to detach 
9  Text box facts and figures from Merlingen (2009) 
and EUPM (2006). 
10  EUPM official, interview by author, October 2009, 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
itself and its activities from its predecessor’s legacy.
The overarching goal of the EUPM was 
“to establish sustainable policing arrangements 
under BiH ownership in accordance with best 
European and international practice” (Council of 
the European Union 2002). It had four strategic 
priorities: (1) development of police independence 
and accountability under political oversight, (2) fight 
against organized crime and corruption, (3) financial 
viability and sustainability, and (4) institution and 
capacity building at management level (EUPM 
2006: 4). These four priorities were pursued through 
programmes on seven themes: (1) crime police, 
(2) criminal justice, (3) internal affairs, (4) police 
administration, (5) public order and security, (6) 
State Border Service, and (7) State Information and 
Protection Agency (Juncos 2007: 62).
 The EUPM II (2006-2007) had different 
objectives, as well as differently organized 
portfolios, while readopting on the most important, 
uncompleted aspects of the EUPM I mandate, such 
as fight against corruption and organized crime. The 
same was the case with EUPM III (2008-2010), with 
each new mandate having a more and more focused 
approach, leading to the Bosnian police being the 
most reformed police sector in Europe.11 Overall, 
the EUPM I was believed to be pursuing a long-term 
institutional reform strategy with the aim of changing 
the police structures (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 
2005: 8). This also led to the “perception of political 
bias: the police reform was suspected of a hidden 
agenda, of being used as a means to another end, 
namely, state centralization” (Batt 2008: 19). 
 
3.1.3 Outcome Evaluation
According to the internal assessment of EUPM 
I, being a total of 452 projects that have been 
evaluated within 27 locations, “67.5% of all the 
selected projects recorded full implementation,” 
but given that some of the assessments started 
as early as September 2005, it would be “safe to 
conclude that implementation of projects exceeded 
70%” by December 2005 (EUPM 2006: 52). The 
outcome evaluation in this paper, however, puts 
the internal assessment in a broader perspective, 
looking at the overall achievements of the mandate, 
the hurdles encountered during the course of the 
implementation, and then focusing on the aspects of 
the mandate related to local ownership.
 From an evaluating perspective, the 
EUPM I mission ought to be credited with at 
11  EUPM official, interview by author, October 2009, 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 
EUPM I9
Duration: January 2003–December 2005
Budget: total allocated - €70.61 million; total 
spent - €47.54 million
International staff: peak capacity - 540 (a 
total of 1,361 international police officers and 
97 international civilians deployed over 4 main 
rotations in the course of the mandate)
Contributing countries: 27 EU member states 
and 7 third states
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least two achievements. First, it “has advanced 
the transformation of the Bosnian police from an 
instrument of ethnic warfare into a professional 
service” (Merlingen 2009: 162). Second, it 
contributed significantly to the change of Bosnian 
policing mentalities, institutions and practices, as 
well as bringing them closer to the European norms 
and standards (ibid.). At the same time, some issues, 
such as organized crime and corruption, have 
remained high on the list of problems the country is 
faced with and are therefore the key problems that 
EUPM III has been focusing on.
 However, looking at the planning phase of 
the mission, two factors have influenced the way the 
Planning Team carved out the EUPM I mandate, which 
ultimately negatively affected its effectiveness. First, 
the three fact-finding missions in the pre-planning 
phase were rather brief and visited the BiH capital 
only, which clearly had an impact on the proposals 
they prepared (EUPM 2006: 14). Second, in many 
instances “the Planning Team based its planning on 
the assumptions that the IPTF programmes would 
have reached an advanced stage of development 
by the end of 2002” which, according to an EUPM 
report on the first three years of the mission, proved 
to be inaccurate (EUPM 2006: 15). 
 Another problem the mission was faced 
with in the implementation of the mandate was, as 
mentioned before, the legacy of its predecessor, 
IPTF. With the first Head of Mission of EUPM I being 
the former Commissioner of the IPTF and many 
officers transferred from one mission to the other, 
the line of distinction in the eyes of the public was 
rather blurred, often leading to confusion where the 
IPTF’s mandate stopped and the EUPM I’s started.12 
The IPTF undertook a certification process of police 
officers after the war, setting certain standards and 
issuing certification only to those police officers 
that met these standards. The certification process 
was heavily disputed, which affected the image of 
the IPTF. Consequently, the IPTF legacy was not 
necessarily an asset for the EUPM when dealing 
with local police. Additionally, many of the IPTF 
field location officers that remained as parts of the 
EUPM were left to day-to-day operationally focused 
decisions instead of adopting the programmatic way 
that was foreseen for EUPM. This was one of the 
factors that delayed the programme and project 
implementation, and it was only after a rotation of 
a significant number of EUPM officers, former IPTF, 
that this was changed.13 
 Moreover, the initial structure and strategy 
12  EUPM official, interview by author, October 2009, 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13  EUPM official, interview by author, October 2009, 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
of EUPM I appear to be more compatible with an 
executive mandate than with a non-executive one of 
monitoring, mentoring and inspecting. Similarly, it is 
important to note that, while the EUPM I had a non-
executive mandate and could not initiate disciplinary 
or criminal investigations against police officers, 
it could bring problematic cases to the attention of 
the HR/EUSR, who had the authority to remove the 
person in question from the function. To that end, the 
Bonn powers were an assisting mechanism, which 
could be invoked by the OHR if needed. 
 In addition, the mandate was broad, aiming 
at establishing a sustainable police in accordance 
with the best European and international practices. 
These practices, however, were not stipulated 
anywhere at the beginning of the mandate. This 
created confusion among the EUPM personnel, 
who were unsure of what benchmarks were to be 
met, and marked the overall mission mandate 
implementation.14 
 Finally, the reports and benchmarking 
system from 2003 did not provide reliable indicators 
that would allow for a comprehensive overview of 
the project implementation. The system allowed for 
measuring the progress made, but said little about 
the actual quality (Juncos 2007: 71). As a result, 
mission personnel did not make a secret of their 
disregard of projects. Consequently, the mission 
was left to improvise and develop a benchmarking 
system to meet the existing needs. The ‘learning 
by doing’ approach was confusing not only for the 
EUPM personnel, but even more so for the local 
police.15
 Despite these problems, however, EUPM I 
“monitored the implementation of reform projects; 
mentored street police and mid-level management 
police in how to improve their work routines; advised 
senior police managers on how to overcome gaps 
in police operational capacity and improve police 
leadership and law enforcement strategies; and 
provided recommendations to political authorities on 
how to reform the security sector and the criminal 
justice system more broadly” (Merlingen 2009: 
164). The mission was mandated to develop local 
capacity and ownership in the police sector, while 
depoliticizing the police itself. To that end, some of 
the activities undertaken could be regarded as one-
off, such as, for instance, the development of the 
State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), 
with full police powers and the capacity to investigate 
serious and organized crime cases in the country. 
This agency was literally established from scratch 
14  Council Secretariat official, interview by author, 
January 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
15  Derived from interviews by author with Bosnian 
officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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during the mandate of EUPM I.
 In addition, many programmes of EUPM I 
continued to be carried out within the mandate of 
EUPM II and III. The EUPM I is nowadays seen as 
a mission without which the reforms taking place 
nowadays would have been impossible to happen.16 
In line with the mandate’s focus on local ownership, 
during the first quarter of 2003, EUPM distributed 
the first needs-assessment questionnaire to all 33 
different co-locations, the answers to which were 
entered into a central database in early March 
2003 (EUPM 2006: 42). Despite the disparity in 
quality of answers, the questionnaire helped identify 
local police’s needs. Nevertheless, according to 
the EUPM assessment, there were two obstacles 
to the questionnaire results significantly affecting 
the shaping of the reforms: (1) the questionnaire 
appeared to be a repetition of a similar IPTF 
questionnaire at the end of 2002, which is seen 
to have possibly negatively affected the quality of 
responses, and (2) most of the reform programmes 
were already decided on prior to any analysis of the 
answers to the questionnaire (EUPM 2006: 42). 
 Also related to the emphasis on local 
ownership, it was within the local — cantonal/
security center/Brcko District — police authorities’ 
responsibility to decide whether the programmes, 
which were left out from the subsequent mission 
mandates, were needed further.17 
 Following the completion of the EUPM I 
mandate, concerned precisely with local ownership, 
it was decided for the Programme Development and 
Coordination Department (PDCD) of the EUPM to be 
re-formulated. Namely, the role of the PDCD during 
the second mandate was to oversee the completion 
of the programmes that were not completed during 
the EUPM I mandate and whose implementation had 
been left to the Bosnian police authorities.18 However, 
the actual decision on whether to implement a 
programme or not rested with the police authorities in 
BiH, which, given the complexity of police structures, 
allowed for a rather decentralized decision-making on 
this matter. This is precisely where the implementation 
differed.19 Namely, the different police authorities from 
the Federation, Republika Srpska and Brcko District 
were expected to cooperate closely with each other. 
16  Derived from interviews by author with EUPM 
and Bosnian officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
17  EUPM official, interview by author, October 2009, 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18  Former EUPM official, e-mail interview by author, 
January 2010.
19  Bosnian Ministry of Security official, interview by 
author, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However, a reform being kept in place only in one of 
the entities or Brcko or only by some of the cantonal 
police forces in the Federation or some of the public 
security centers in Republika Srpska, would hardly 
facilitate the overall police cooperation.20 In addition, 
some of the reforms, which were to be decided upon, 
might have been useful in the long run. However, the 
different police authorities at the time could hardly 
decide what was useful and needed at operational 
level, without taking the political implications of the 
reform into consideration.21 Given that possible 
political implications were allowed to play a crucial 
role in deciding which reforms were to be continued, 
the diverging, if not conflicting, political interests 
of the different administrative units contributed to 
differences in the implementation.
 Another aspect that concerns local ownership 
was the establishment of the BiH Police Steering 
Board (PSB), a body established by the EUPM in 
order to allow for key decision-makers in the area of 
rule of law in BiH to discuss crucial issues, such as 
defining common policing strategies and identifying 
needs and operational priorities (EUPM 2006: 49). 
The PSB has six members: the Federation Director 
of Police, Republika Srpska Director of Police, the 
Police Chief of Brcko District, the Director and Chief 
of Service of the State Border Service, the Director 
of the State Investigation and Protection Agency and 
the EUPM Head of Mission (EUPM 2006: 49). This 
technically meant involving Bosnian police officials 
in the operational planning process, along with the 
execution of critical police operations. Moreover, 
related to the EUPM programmes, it was the PSB’s 
task to identify problems affecting the policing in most, 
if not all, police administrations, and consequently 
develop solutions together with the EUPM.
Taking the above mentioned issues into 
account, the implementation of the overall mandate 
of EUPM I was problematic and implied certain 
predetermined outcomes given the impossibility 
of a total success without a meaningful reform of 
police structures, which was not within the EUPM I 
mandate. Moreover, it was unrealistic to achieve the 
planned outcomes within a three-year timeframe. 
With most of the one-off programmes still in place, 
some of the other reforms became subject to local 
authorities and have regressed or been left aside in 
the reform process in some parts of the country.22
20  Bosnian Border Police official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21  Bosnian Border Police official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
22  Derived from interviews by author with Bosnian 
officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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3.2 Macedonia
3.2.1 Overview of the EU Involvement in 
Macedonia
The Republic of Macedonia signed the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with the EU on 9 
April 2001. However, the whole Stabilization 
and Association Process (SAP) was placed on 
a standby with the outbreak of an ethnic conflict 
in the northwest of the country in the summer of 
2001. The conflict started with sporadic and violent 
inter-ethnic incidents as early as March 2001. The 
clashes, primarily between the Macedonian security 
forces, composed mainly of ethnic Macedonians, 
and ethnic Albanian militia, continued until August 
2001 (Flessenkemper 2008: 80). The successful 
negotiations under the EU and NATO auspices 
provided the basis for preventing further escalation 
of the conflict and paved the way for a peaceful 
conflict resolution. This resulted in the signing of 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) on 13 
August 2001 (Schneckener 2002). The Agreement 
stipulated several amendments to the Constitution 
and structural and administrative reforms that 
aimed at ameliorating the inter-ethnic relations 
and establishing a solid foundation for multiethnic 
cohabitation. The OFA included provisions about 
decentralization and delegating more power to 
local jurisdictions, improving the representation of 
minorities in the public administration, adapting the 
use of minority languages in public institutions at 
national and local level, and several other reforms. 
The provisions on minority representation in the 
state apparatus also required reforms in the security 
sector, including the police.
The conflict in Macedonia and its settlement 
created an environment in which the EU was in a 
position to assume greater responsibilities and a 
leading role in the region. Consequently, considering 
the growing aid that the EU was providing for the 
region, the Union was called for to coordinate the 
international efforts in monitoring and assisting in 
the implementation of the Agreement (Mace 2004). 
In this sense, Macedonia was the first country where 
the EU was asked and, more importantly, prepared to 
take on a leading role among the other international 
actors present in the country.
The EU itself, looking for an opportunity to 
test its crisis management capabilities (Bjorkdahl 
2005) and having already invested substantially in 
stabilizing Macedonia, was willing and ready to take 
over from NATO in ensuring a secure and stable 
environment in post-conflict Macedonia.23  
 This led the EU to launch the Operation 
Concordia in Macedonia on 31 March 2003 
(Council of the European Union 2003b), which 
was the first military mission deployed within the 
ESDP framework. Concordia was represented in 
Macedonia with personnel totalling 350 people from 
13 EU member states and 14 third states. It was “to 
contribute to a stable, secure environment in which 
to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement” 
(Gross 2009: 173). In practical terms, however, 
the mission had a rather limited mandate, focusing 
primarily on disarmament and activities such as 
“patrolling, reconnaissance, surveillance, situational 
awareness, reporting and liaison activities” (Gross 
2009: 176).
 At the same time, the EU was also present 
in the country through the EC Delegation, the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), as 
well as the EUSR (Ioannides 2007). In addition, 
Concordia was followed by EUPOL Proxima, and by 
EUPAT, the European Union Police Advisory Team, 
both assisting a reform of the police sector.
The overall police reform process in 
Macedonia was closely linked to the SAP and 
the OFA implementation process. Reforms in the 
security sector, including the police, were needed 
with the very adoption of the Constitution of the 
newly independent Republic of Macedonia in 1991 
and the change of the political system. This also 
begged a change in the role ascribed to the police 
by the political sphere — shifting away from being 
a force protecting and preserving the public order 
and having the interests of the state as the guiding 
principle, towards one protecting the citizens and 
having the individual rights and needs at the core 
of its activities. However, the process was delayed, 
which contributed, to a certain extent, to the conflict 
in 2001 and the inability to prevent the violent 
outbreak thereof. Among other stumbling blocks, 
the conflict shed light on the unbalanced minority 
representation in the police forces, making the police 
predominantly ethnic Macedonian, which resulted 
in ethnically biased policing (Flessenkemper 2008: 
80). With the signing of the SAA, and later the 
OFA, the Macedonian Government had taken up 
the responsibility to reform the security sector, 
specifically the police sector and to meet certain 
European standards, as well as to address the long-
standing issues outlined above. 
EU member states´ experts assisted 
the Macedonian Ministry of the Interior (MoI) in 
23  In the immediate aftermath of the conflict and the 
signing of the OFA, NATO deployed the Operation Essential 
Harvest, which had two small follow-up missions, Amber Fox 
and Allied Harmony.
S
P
E
S
 P
olicy P
apers 2010
11
developing key strategic documents for police reform 
through the European Commission Justice and Home 
Affairs Team (ECJHAT) in 2003-2004 (Ioannides 
2006: 72). Furthermore, the implementation of the 
police reforms in the MoI and the partner institutions 
in 2004 were guided by a European Commission 
Police Reform Project (ECPRP) (Ioannides 2006: 
72).
 In short, there was a great number of EU 
‘faces’ on the ground. After the completion of the 
mandates of all ESDP missions in Macedonia, 
the EU remained represented in the country by a 
double-hatted representative, i.e. a person acting 
as both EU Special Representative and Head of the 
EC Delegation to the country. The double-hatting 
contributed to a more harmonized approach and 
better relations among the plethora of EU actors on 
the ground (Gross 2007: 137). On the contrary, the 
fact that these two positions were separate before 
added a lot of confusion and tension as to what the 
EU was standing and who was speaking on behalf 
of the Union.24 Besides, the EU’s role in Macedonia 
has become ever more important since the country 
received a candidate status in December 2005. On 
the one hand, the candidate status is seen as a 
‘carrot’, enabling the EU to use ‘sticks’ in ensuring 
implementation of the reforms that would lead 
the candidate country to meet certain European 
standards. At the same time, it also reinforces the 
need for bigger local ownership given the importance 
of self-governance in the EU integration process.
 
3.2.2 EUPOL PROXIMA
The EU, as one of the main mediators to the OFA 
and one of the guarantors of its implementation, was 
invited by the Macedonian Government to provide 
assistance in the implementation of the reforms 
24  Former Macedonian MoI official, interview by 
author, September 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
25  Text box facts and figures from Ioannides (2009).
in the police sector. On 15 December 2003, the 
EU deployed the EU Police Mission Proxima to 
Macedonia. Originally, Proxima was planned for one 
year, as a non-executive civilian follow-up mission 
to Concordia. However, the mandate was later 
extended for another year (see below). 
With assistance of EC experts, as mentioned 
above, a Macedonian expert team developed 
a comprehensive National Police Strategy. The 
Strategy, being a key document in guiding the police 
reform process, was approved by the Macedonian 
Government at the beginning of 2004.26 In this 
process, Proxima’s legal team helped improve the 
Strategy by commenting on its draft.27 EU experts 
also assisted in the development of the Macedonian 
Integrated Border Management Strategy (Ioannides 
2006: 72). 
 Proxima’s objective was to monitor, mentor 
and advise senior and mid-level management 
police officers, and in that sense, promote the 
implementation of the two strategies, both the National 
Police and the Integrated Border Management 
Strategy. To that end, while the EU was the main 
actor in providing support regarding the organization 
and the restructuring through EAR, the OSCE and 
the US Embassy (through the International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program, ICITAP) 
were in charge of training the police officers whereas 
Proxima monitored, mentored and advised the police 
in their day-to-day work. 
 The activities of Proxima stretched across 
five programmes: (1) uniformed police, (2) criminal 
police, (3) Department for State Security and 
Counter-Intelligence, (4) internal control, and 
(5) border police (Ioannides 2009: 190). Mission 
teams were deployed to regional and local police 
headquarters in the former conflict areas in the 
northern and the northwestern part of the country, as 
well as to the MoI.
 With a mandate as ambitious as Proxima’s, 
the mission faced challenges in completing all 
the programmes within one year, which led to the 
extension of the mission for another year. The 
2004-2005 part of the mission came to be known 
as Proxima II, with a downsized staff deployed 
countrywide and a mandate covering but three, and 
not the previous five, programmes with a focus on: 
(1) organized crime, (2) public peace and order and 
(3) border police (Ioannides 2009: 191).
 Both the deployment of Proxima and the 
extension of the mandate were accompanied by a 
concern of the Macedonian Government that having 
26  Former Macedonian MoI official, interview by 
author, September 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
27  Former Proxima official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
 
EUPOL Proxima25
Duration: Proxima I: December 2003–December 
2004; Proxima II: December 2004–December 
2005
Budget: total allocated - €15 million (Proxima I), 
€15.95 million (Proxima II)
International staffing: Proxima I: 186; 
Proxima II: 169
Contributing countries: Proxima I: 22 EU 
member states and 4 third countries; Proxima II: 
24 members states and 4 third countries
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a peace mission on its soil would undermine its 
aspirations for becoming a candidate-country for 
EU membership (Flessenkemper 2008: 90). This 
ultimately led to the termination of the mission on 14 
December 2005. 
3.2.3 Outcome Evaluation
In evaluating the outcome of the mission’s mandate, 
this subchapter focuses on the overall achievements 
that the mission can be credited with and the 
obstacles it faced, while going further to relate the 
mandate to the role that local ownership played in its 
implementation. 
Proxima’s biggest contribution is twofold. 
First, a large portion of the mission staff was deployed 
in the field. It provided much needed data on how the 
reforms were accepted by the police authorities in the 
different parts of the country28, and what the actual 
needs were.29 These assessments are perceived 
across the board as the most valuable legacy of the 
mission and are often used even nowadays when 
it comes to certain investments in the police sector, 
especially by the EAR and other foreign donors.30 
Second, as already noted, Proxima was deployed in 
an already overcrowded theatre, with international 
donors often having different visions and different 
modi operandi. On numerous occasions this was 
confusing and frustrating for the local police.31 
Proxima, however, became the dominant player in 
the sense of coordinating the foreign actors involved 
in the police sector, which was achieved primarily 
through regular expert briefings.32 These meetings 
of heads of the key international actors in the 
country guaranteed political coordination. In addition 
to the regular meetings, chaired by the EUSR, the 
coordination in the police sector was ensured through 
the creation of the so-called ‘Police Experts Group’ 
that brought together the Proxima Head of Mission, 
the ECJHAT/EPRP Coordinator, the EUSR Police 
Advisor, representatives from the EC Delegation, 
the EAR, EU member states, the OSCE, ICITAP and 
other international actors involved in the reform of 
the Macedonian police forces (Ioannides 2006: 79).
28  Former Macedonian MoI official, interview by 
author, September 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
29  Former Proxima official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
30  Derived from various interviews by author, 
September-October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
31  Former Proxima official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
32  Former Macedonian MoI official, interview by 
author, September 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
At the same time, aside of the already noted 
obstacles arising from the local context and the 
delay in passing the new police law in Macedonia, 
Proxima was faced with several hurdles in the 
implementation of its mandate arising from two key 
issues. First, the planning phase of the mission, 
which lasted for two months, did not provide a solid 
basis for a smooth kick-off of the mission.33 As a 
consequence, Proxima had to dedicate the first three 
months of the mandate to do a detailed assessment 
of the state of the Macedonian police before any 
activities could be started (Flessenkemper 2098: 
82). In addition, the mission was not equipped with 
“police reform knowledge base and an appropriate 
toolbox for programme management even though 
[the EU had] an inventory of standardized tools 
and methodologies”. This meant for the mission 
personnel to develop their own programme and 
management methodologies. As a consequence, the 
reform projects started only six months later within 
the mandate, and many projects were incomplete at 
the end of the first year (Flessenkemper 2008: 82). 
Second, the poor coordination among 
various EU actors on the ground and in Brussels 
also affected the mandate implementation. The 
mission, sharing its premises with the Office 
of the EUSR, had difficulties in preventing the 
EUSR Office members from interfering with the 
implementation of its mandate, which was at times 
very counterproductive.34 In addition, the relations 
between Proxima and the EC Delegation were 
problematic, too. According to former Proxima 
officials, the mission was perceived as a competitor 
to the EC PRP.35 To top it all, a great tension between 
the EUSR and the Head of the EC Delegation 
occurred, which was not kept secret from the public 
eye either (Flessenkemper 2008: 92).
However, beyond these problems, the 
mission accomplished some tangible results. To 
name but a few, Proxima’s monitoring, mentoring 
and advising contributed to improve the skills of 
the local police in their fight against drug trafficking, 
strengthened internal control and increased capacity 
for cooperation with the judicial branch and the 
neighbouring countries (Flessenkemper 2008: 93-
94). Additionally, due to the lack of a comprehensive 
benchmarking system at the EU level, the mission 
developed its own system by setting specific 
deadlines for result-oriented activities, which were 
33  Council Secretariat official, interview by author, 
January 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
34  Former Proxima official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
35  Derived from interview by author with former 
Proxima officials, October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
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monitored on a weekly basis.36 This system, being 
approved ex ante by the MoI, led to a successful 
implementation of the reforms (Ioannides 2006: 76). 
After the completion of the mandate, only 
few programmes were picked up and continued 
being carried through by the EC Delegation and 
some of the embassies in the country. Importantly, 
many of the programmes were completed as one-
off, such as, for instance, the development of a 
vision and mission of the Macedonian police.37 
These, and other seemingly small things, are seen 
to have paved the way for the police reform process 
to progress and the crucial reforms to take place.38 It 
is important to note that there has been no regress 
in the implementation (i.e. they are still in place) of 
any of the aspects covered by the mandate since its 
completion.39 
Finally, there appears to exist an agreement 
on what was essential for the Macedonian police 
to be able to keep up with the pace of reforms.40 
First, during those three years (2003-2005), the 
majority of the MoI personnel was trained through 
various international donors’ programmes (including 
Proxima’s) in different aspects of policing. This 
contributed to the overall capacity building, which 
allowed for the MoI to be at the core of the reforms 
and led the reform process further with less 
international assistance. Moreover, while changes 
related to the integration of minority representatives 
in the structures did slow down the process, as 
any structural change would, they did not affect 
the reforms in other negative ways. Consequently, 
as observed by a former Proxima and later EC 
Delegation official, who had been present in the 
country since the planning phase of Proxima, the 
level of development is tremendous; the discussions 
one can hear among the MoI officials nowadays are 
at a completely different and higher level than those 
after the conflict and reflect the state-of-the-art in the 
police field across Europe.41 While it is not easy in 
such a timeframe to go from disbanding paramilitary 
36  Derived from interviews by author with Council 
Secretariat officials, January 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
37  Former EC Delegation official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
38  Former EC Delegation official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
39  Various interviews by author, September-October 
2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
40  Derived from interviews by author with former 
Proxima, EC and Council Secretariat, and Macedonian MoI 
officials, September 2009—January 2010, Skopje, Macedonia 
and Brussels, Belgium.
41  Former Proxima official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
bodies, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, to 
human resource management at the MoI, there has 
been a significant change of horizon; “there was a 
lot of effort to get the ball rolling, but now the ball is 
rolling down the hill”.42
42  Former Proxima official, interview by author, 
October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.
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4. Cross-Case Comparison
After having outlined the two cases, the final section 
of this paper analyzes findings of the research 
undertaken in Bosnia and Macedonia with regard 
to the outcome sustainability. It further proceeds 
to present the argument put forward in this paper 
(that greater involvement of the locals actors early 
on in the decision-making and the reform-shaping 
process contributes to longer-lasting and more 
sustainable reforms) in the context of the empirical 
data of EUPM I and EUPOL Proxima.
 
4.1 Caveats 
 In order to be able to compare and contrast two 
cases, it is imperative to first outline the similarities 
and what makes them comparable, as well as the 
obvious differences and caveats which have to be 
kept in mind when analyzing the two countries, 
Macedonia and Bosnia, and the two missions, 
EUPOL Proxima and EUPM I respectively.
A closer look reveals that the two countries 
have many similarities. Both have a multiethnic 
character and have gone through an ethnic conflict, 
even though the scope of the conflicts differed—the 
one in Bosnia lasted significantly longer, and was 
much more destructive both materially and in terms of 
human suffering, not to mention the state apparatus. 
In addition, the countries have similar histories, both 
being parts of the former Ottoman Empire, later 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and 
consequently being parts of former Yugoslavia, both 
existing as federal republics. Moreover, they were at 
a similar level of economic development, significantly 
lagging behind the other Yugoslav republics. To 
that end, the economic stagnation is equally an 
obstacle for the development of both. Moreover, the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) country reports point 
to the problem of corruption even at the highest level 
of government, which is another obstacle for reforms 
in both countries (ICG 2002, ICG 1999). Starting 
from these similar circumstances, the conflicts in the 
countries differ and hence, so do the post-conflict 
settlements and the ESDP missions. 
First, while the peace settlement for Bosnia, 
the Dayton Agreement, aimed to re-establish 
the state institutions from scratch, post-conflict 
Macedonia remained a functional state, with many 
reforms to be undertaken. At the same time, the level 
of centralization of the two countries is significantly 
different, and has critically affected the outcome 
of the reform implementation. Namely, while 
Macedonia has been a fairly centralized country until 
recently, with the decentralization process taking 
place parallel to the OFA implementation, Bosnia’s 
state structure is so complex, that it allowed for a lot 
more ‘spoilers’ and profiteers from a dysfunctional 
state to exist, and measured against the capacity to 
undertake reforms, the level was significantly lower. 
Second, the two countries were at different 
stages in their relations with the EU at the time of 
the missions. Macedonia was struggling to get 
a candidate status, hence it was important to 
demonstrate its ability to govern its territory by itself. 
Bosnia, on the other hand, had only signed the 
SAA in 2008, and has only recently started to work 
towards harmonizing its legislation with the acquis 
communautaire. 
Third, in both countries the EU has been 
present through various institutions and projects. 
However, one important difference can be found in 
the EU presence in Bosnia, which was somewhat 
streamlined and hierarchical, as it was led by the 
OHR. The OHR has the highest concentration of 
power among the various EU actors on the ground 
and has at times played a role as one of the most 
important political actors in the country (Knaus and 
Martin 2003). Such a high degree of hierarchy did 
not exist in the case of Macedonia.
Fourth, focusing on the police missions only, 
the mandate of Proxima was limited to monitoring, 
mentoring and advising, while EUPM’s objective 
was to monitor, mentor and inspect. The qualitative 
difference is in the possibility for the EUPM ‘to 
inspect’, i.e. the option to initiate removal from 
office of a non-compliant police officer. While this 
has been done in general by the Head of Mission 
communicating the non-compliance to the local 
authority in charge (usually the Interior Minister), 
there have also been instances when the issues 
have been taken further. Namely, with the Bonn 
powers at hand, the OHR can remove people from 
office. Different High Representatives have used 
this power to a different extent. However, the very 
possibility of being able to use this mechanism 
equips the EUPM with an ‘executive extended hand’ 
and gives the non-executive mandate a different 
twist.
Fifth, each of the two missions, EUPM I and 
Proxima, developed its own benchmarking system 
for assessing the implementation of their mandate 
activities. Nevertheless, the EUPM benchmarking 
system was considered “complicated and unable 
to identify the objectives of activities” (Ioannides 
2009: 192). The one in Macedonia, on the other 
hand, is seen as one of the tools that ensured the 
implementation of reforms (Ioannides 2009: 192).
Sixth, while the EUPM was deployed to 
Bosnia on the basis of a UN mandate, derived 
from the Dayton Agreement, Proxima was sent to 
Macedonia based on an invitation by the Macedonian 
Government. Deployment based on an invitation by 
the locals provides a more solid basis for a sense of 
local ownership to develop than when the mission is 
externally ‘initiated’.
Seventh and foremost, while in the case 
of Macedonia the National Police Strategy and the 
Integrated Border Management Strategy, the main 
documents that led the reforms, were primarily 
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prepared by national actors, the reforms in Bosnia 
were rather introduced from the outside based on the 
assessment of primarily external actors. In addition, 
“Proxima’s interventions in the local policing field […] 
were programmed together with senior local officials 
of the [MoI]” (Flessenkemper 2008: 86). Moreover, 
the benchmarking system of Proxima was endorsed 
by the MoI which ensured smoother implementation 
of the reforms and greater willingness to adapt to 
the changes at lower levels in the hierarchy of the 
Macedonian police. It is also worth noting that those 
segments of the police structure that are affected 
by the current mandate of EUPM, which are in 
fact the core areas of the police reforms, can only 
be assessed, in a similar manner as in the case 
of Proxima, once the mission personnel has been 
withdrawn from the country. 
With these caveats in mind, EUPOL Proxima 
in Macedonia and EUPM I in Bosnia still allow for 
a cross-case comparison with some generalizable 
conclusions. The next section does this by comparing 
the assessments of the two cases. 
4.2 A Comparative Assessment
Evaluating the present post-conflict situation, it is 
clear that in both cases there has been no return 
to violence and peace has been preserved. At the 
same time, definite conflict resolution has not been 
achieved by either one of the two. Instead, the two 
cases can be analyzed in terms of the progress 
made, and here with the focus on reforming the 
police forces.
 In both cases, most of the reforms that have 
been introduced and were meant to remain (i.e. 
that were not merely temporary measures) are still 
in place. Those particular reforms are considered 
to be the decisive aspects for the overall reform. 
Apart from them, the effects of most of the one-off 
programmes of the missions – the ones, which did 
not continue to be carried through by another donor 
or within the subsequent mission mandate – are still 
present. Finally, the two cases differ in terms of the 
programmes that were neither one-off, nor continued 
to be carried out by another donor/subsequent 
mission mandate, and were handed over to the 
local authorities to decide on their continuation. In 
Macedonia, most of these reforms are still in place. In 
BiH, on the other hand, they differ across entities and 
even across smaller administrative units (cantons, 
public security centers and Brcko District).43 
43  Derived from interviews by author with Bosnian 
officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This difference can be seen as a result 
of the origin of many of the reforms. Since, as 
explained above, in the case of Macedonia, the 
strategic documents for the police reform process 
were developed by national experts, while in the 
case of Bosnia, the reforms were not genuinely 
conceived by Bosnian authorities. This is clearly 
not to deny the existence and importance of the 
National Strategy on Community-Based Policing in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was developed by 
Bosnian police experts in 2006 and endorsed by the 
PSB in 2007. However, it became operational only 
in 2006/2007.
 To that end, what made the difference 
were the autonomy of the institutional decision-
making and the level of local involvement, and 
consequently local ownership, in the actual shaping 
of the reforms. While the concept of local ownership 
is usually understood by the international community 
involved in peace operations as the locals taking 
responsibility of the outcomes of the peace process 
(Hansen 2008), in this paper the concept is used to 
refer to the ‘ownership’ of the locals of the actual 
reform process. This could mean local experts’ 
engagement in preparing the documents which 
guide the reforms and/or the locals’ involvement in 
the decision-making process regarding the reforms 
throughout the implementation. In that sense, a 
stronger participation of the locals in the document 
preparation and the decision-making ensures a 
stronger sense of local ownership of the overall 
reform process. 
Regarding the three different types of reforms 
mentioned above — (1) one-off reform activities, (2) 
reforms that continued being carried through by other 
donors or subsequent mission mandates, and (3) 
reforms whose continuation was left to the discretion 
of local authorities — and considering that the first 
two types are still in place/undergoing in both Bosnia 
and in Macedonia, it is only the last category that 
differs. It is this difference, the sustainability of those 
reforms in Bosnia varying across the different units 
and the ones in Macedonia being preserved, this 
paper sought to explain. Accordingly, the core of the 
proposed argument is the following: the higher the 
degree of local involvement in shaping the reforms 
from an early stage, the longer lasting the reforms 
will be.
The argument is linked to a three-stage 
development, where each stage relates to a certain 
point where decisions take place, rather than to the 
degree of their importance. First, a higher autonomy 
or involvement of the local actors in the shaping of the 
reforms right from the beginning can lead to an early 
detection of the areas that need to be addressed. 
In most cases, however, the state institutions do 
not have the capacity to do so immediately after the 
conflict, as it is already very difficult to get the former 
conflicting parties around one table in order to decide 
on sensitive issues in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict. Nevertheless, this provides an opportunity 
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for a political consensus to be built and sets the basis 
for the reforms to take place. Resistance to change 
is expected, but the intensity of resistance is lesser 
when the decision has the backing of the political 
leader of those affected by the changes, i.e. the police 
officers. Moreover, even if a political consensus is 
not reached, bringing the different parties to discuss 
these issues allows for detecting the most sensitive 
areas and finding feasible alternatives. The second 
stage is linked to the development of the key 
documents, which guide the reforms. In most cases 
the reforms are based on the peace settlement, 
but the specificities thereof are defined in detail in 
various other documents. Stronger involvement, if 
not autonomy, of local experts in the field when such 
documents are prepared affects the local police in 
not perceiving the reforms as something alien and 
consequently, taking a greater responsibility over 
their implementation. Finally, the third stage relates 
to the local police authorities’ involvement in the 
decision-making during the actual reform process. 
In Macedonia, the locals were involved 
in all three stages of the process. In Bosnia, they 
only became significantly involved in the third stage, 
i.e. after the reforms had already been defined 
externally. This alone is not sufficient for local 
ownership of the reform process, and consequently 
the reform outcomes, to develop. This paper argues 
that, as demonstrated above, at least participation in 
one more of the former two stages is necessary for 
such a development to unfold.
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5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
With the EU gaining a more prominent role in peace 
operations, it was argued that it is important to 
be able to evaluate not only the completion of the 
mission mandates, but also the sustainability of what 
has been achieved. In doing so, this paper analyzed 
two completed police mandates in the Balkans, 
the ‘place of birth’ of the ESDP, thereby taking into 
account that the main mechanism of the EU in the 
field of peace operations is the deployment of civilian 
missions (including police). The mission mandates 
under analysis were EUPM I in BiH and EUPOL 
Proxima in Macedonia. 
 Acknowledging both the differences and 
the similarities in the contexts of the two countries, 
as well as in the mission mandates and the actual 
implementation of the reforms, the paper outlines 
three different kinds of reforms: (1) those that are 
seen as one-off activities; (2) those programmes 
picked up by other international actors or subsequent 
mission mandates; (3) those aspects that were left 
to the decision of the local authorities as to whether 
they should be continued or not. The research shows 
that the first two groups of reforms have remained in 
place, or have continued to be implemented in both 
cases. The third group, however, has proven to vary 
in terms of implementation in Bosnia, while it has 
been kept in place in Macedonia. 
 From analyzing these differences, the paper 
concludes that the stronger the engagement of locals 
in the planning and the decision-making during the 
reform process, the more sustainable the reforms 
will be. It further develops three chronological stages 
of involvement: (1) consulting locals during the 
mission planning and building political consensus 
for the reforms, (2) involving local expertise in 
developing key reform documents and (3) engaging 
local authorities in the decision-making throughout 
the reform process. This is a modification of the so-
called principle of local ownership in the sense that 
it does not only focus on the responsibility for the 
outcomes, but also for the entire reform process from 
planning to implementation. This means that the local 
authorities are present in the early conceptualization 
of the reforms, rather than inheriting certain pre-done 
‘homework’. Consequently, the third stage alone is 
not sufficient to ensure reform sustainability.
Before proceeding to identify some policy 
recommendations for the EU, it is important to 
acknowledge all the improvements that have already 
been made in the field of ESDP operations at a general 
level. Namely, while at the beginning the EU opted 
for an excessive deployment of missions, recently 
there have been a lot of reflexive actions, resulting in 
improved internal evaluation mechanisms. To name 
but a few, the EU police concept, which dates back 
to 2002, was updated in 2009, a comprehensive 
benchmarking and reporting system was developed 
and adopted in 2008, etc. In addition, the approach 
the EU chooses for police missions seems to have 
become broader, reflecting on the fact that deploying 
a “simple police mission” may not be enough, if one 
does not take into consideration the wider rule of law 
situation in the country.44 
In order to achieve further progress in ESDP 
missions, the following recommendations might be 
helpful: Firstly, local actors (e.g. experts, politicians, 
civil society, etc.) should be involved in the planning 
process of the missions as early as possible. That 
is to say, local actors should not only be contacted 
during the exploratory missions, but also be actively 
engaged. This would not only help to improve the 
mapping-out of the situation on the ground and to 
detect the needs of the local authorities, but also to 
build a political consensus on the reforms and lessen 
the impression that reforms are being imposed 
upon the locals thus intensifying the sense of local 
ownership. Local ownership would not be limited 
to the reform outcomes, but extended to the actual 
reform process.
Secondly, the EU should develop a 
systematic approach of how to identify the local 
actors to be consulted during the planning missions 
and those to be involved in the decision-making on 
the reforms. So far this has been done on an ad-
hoc basis, based on internal recommendations from 
within the EU apparatus.45 While a broad spectrum 
of actors is usually approached in this process, 
a systematic selection that would reflect not only 
power constellations, but also the concentration 
of knowledge would be desirable. This would 
tremendously strengthen the legitimacy of the 
suggested reforms. 
 Thirdly, the EU should develop a regional 
approach when deploying several civilian missions 
in the same geographical area. This should be 
done not only because criminals know no borders, 
but also because countries in the same region 
often face similar problems. The same applies 
to post-conflict situations in the Balkans where a 
systematic reporting by ESDP mission personnel to 
the coordinating structures in Brussels could prove 
useful for future missions, especially concerning 
EULEX in Kosovo. Finally, the EU should encourage 
cooperation between the authorities of the countries 
to which it deploys police missions because the 
locals could both share the lessons learned and 
provide collective feedback of a more general nature 
to the EU officials.
44  Council Secretariat official, interview by author, 
January 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
45  Derived from interviews by author with Council 
Secretariat Officials, January 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
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 7. Abbreviations
BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCM – Civilian Crisis Management
EAR – European Agency for Reconstruction 
EC – European Commission 
ECJHAT – European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team
ECPRP – European Commission Police Reform Project
ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy
EU – European Union
EUFOR – European Union Military Force
EULEX – European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUPAT – European Union Police Advisory Team
EUPM – European Union Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL – European Union Police Mission
EUSR – EU Special Representative
HR – High Representative
ICG – International Crisis Group
ICITAP – US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IPTF – International Police Task Force
MoI – Ministry of the Interior
NATO – North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
OFA – Ohrid Framework Agreement
OHR – Office of the High Representative
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDCD – Programme Development and Coordination Department
PIC – Peace Implementation Council
PSB – Police Steering Board
SAA – Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP – Stabilization and Association Process
SEE – South East Europe
SFOR – NATO Stabilization Force
SIPA – State Investigation and Protection Agency
UN – United Nations
